Digital ID

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Description:

In recent years there has been a movement to introduce biometric information to passports to improve identity security. This type of ID cards will incorporate the following possibilities: biometric information such as retinal scans, fingerprints, DNA data and RFID tracking technology.

In the future, the EU's identity cards will include the holder's name, passport number, nationality, date of birth, gender, expiration date, citizen service number, picture of holder's face and fingerprints.

These new digital IDs were primarily introduced to prevent identity fraud. When technology improves, the embedded chips may also allow rapid clearance through immigration controls with quicker confirmation of identity. Facial Maps are popular for use in Biometric passports as the data (the distances between key facial features) can be gathered from the holder's passport photo without any other information.

Enablers:

  • Homeland Security is considering standardizing a "unique design or color for Real ID licenses," which would effectively create a uniform national ID card.

Inhibitors:

  • The US Real ID cards must include all drivers' home addresses and other personal information printed on the front and in a two-dimensional barcode on the back. The barcode will not be encrypted because of "operational complexity," which means that businesses like bars and banks that require ID would be capable of scanning and recording customers' home addresses.
  • A radio frequency identification (Introduction of RFID) tag is under consideration for the US Real ID cards. Homeland Security is asking for input on how the licenses could incorporate "RFID-enabled vicinity chip technology, in addition to" the two-dimensional barcode requirement.

Paradigms:

  • The encryption scheme used to protect the flow of information between the Dutch biometric passport and a passport reader was cracked on July 28 2005. Though it hasn't been attempted in practice yet, in theory and under ideal conditions some of the data exchanged wirelessly between the passport's built-in contactless chip and a reader (more precisely, the one-way flow of data from the reader to the passport) may be picked up from up to 10 meters away. Once captured and stored, the data then can then be cracked in 2 hours.

Experts:

Joinson, Adam N.; Pain, Carina; Buchana, Tom; Reips, Ulf-Dietrich (2006).
"Watching me, watching you: privacy attitudes and reactions to identity card implementation scenarios in the United Kingdom" (Abstract). Journal of Information Science 32 (4): 334–343. DOI:10.1177/0165551506064902. Retrieved on 2006-12-09.

Timing:

  • The EU agreed upon working towards a biometric passport. As of August 28. 2006 all EU member states had to incorporate a form of biometric recognition to it's identity documents. In 2006 The Netherlands introduced a chip to its passports and ID cards containing the holder's photo.
  • US States must submit a plan of how they'll comply with the Real ID Act by October 7, 2007. If they don't, their residents will not be able to use IDs to board planes or enter federal buildings starting on May 11, 2008.

Web Resources: