Difference between revisions of "Green Shoots"
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===Period of | ===Period of 2010 - 2015=== | ||
The recession drags on in Russia. Unlike other emerging markets, the recession had a significant effect on the Russian economy. And like in most of the northern hemisphere the recession drags on in Russia despite early signs of a rapid recovery. The Russian economy lags far beyond the other BICs (Brazil, India, China) in terms of growth, largely due to relatively low and volatile oil prices $60-$80. | |||
Despite unparalleled energy resources, power outages and heating shortages have been chronic problems in Russia for years due to crumbling infrastructure arising from a combination of chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, mismanagement by political appointees, and diversion of resources by corruption. These problems have the greatest impact in the winter when temperatures in much of Russia are well below 0 C. In February 2012, one month before the presidential election, heat and electricity shortages occur in a number of cities in western Russia. In particular, a number lower income apartment blocks occupied primarily by pensioners and young families are affected. Numerous schools and a hospital also experience outages. Although hundreds of people are moved to temporary accommodations in schools, churches and military facilities, thousands of people die of hypothermia and cold-related complications such as pneumonia. In one city a large number of people, primarily elderly people and children, are hospitalized with respiratory infections. Some of them subsequently die in the hospital, due at least in part to chronic shortage of resources and to overcrowding with flu patients. Although the story is initially not given significant coverage by the mainstream media, it is discussed by news websites and blogs, which give rise to exaggerated rumors and conspiracy theories. The mainstream media eventually begins to cover and downplay the story, even showing a characteristic on-site appearance of Putin on TV "solving the problem", however the late coverage is seen as a cover-up. Public sentiment places responsibility for the scandal squarely on the shoulders of Vladimir Putin and Dimitry Medvedev at the height of the election campaign. | |||
In March 2012, Medvedev loses the presidential election by 1% to Gary Kasparov’s protégé, Sergey Korolev, from the Liberal Democratic party of Russia, who successfully capitalizes on the scandal to erode the credibility of Medvedev and Putin, accusing them of failing to address the needs of ordinary Russian people and instead lining their pockets and those of their oligarch cronies. After the election Putin is still prime minister, however the new president appoints a replacement. After a few politically dramatic months the Duma finally approves of the reformer's nominee for prime minister. | |||
The new government immediately negotiates a commitment of support from the Russian armed forces. Though historically the armed forces have been politically neutral and subservient to the political leadership the new leaders seek the support as a hedge against the entrenched power of Putin and his FSB connections. The new leaders also leverage their new influence over the media to expose shortcomings and abuses during the Putin-Medvedev years and thus to solidify their base of public support. However they do not embark on a nationwide witch-hunt, which they fear might discredit and destabilize their own government. Aside from the selective removal of a few staunch Putin supporters from key government posts, much of the political apparatus initially remains unchanged. | |||
Soon after the new reformers have settled into government, they deploy billions of rubles from the federal stabilization fund (i.e. reserves built up from oil and gas exports) to initiate major projects to improve infrastructure, education, technology, and healthcare. These infrastructure projects are intended to boost refining and smelting capacity, improve transportation and technology, and to raise health and education standards, but the effects of these investments will not be felt for years. | |||
In 2013 Russia joins the WTO. Although the process of joining was started even before Putin’s time it was delayed a number of times, most notably in 2009 when the Medvedev-Putin administration decided to revise Russia’s WTO application to a joint application with Belorussia and Kazakhstan . The new government uses the WTO entry as an opportunity to break with the past and to publicly re-brand Russia as “open for business”. They also make attempts to increase dialogue and cooperation with NATO and China. However some assertive policies, such as Russia’s stance in the arctic and the Caucasus, and its support for regimes such as Iran and North Korea, are maintained. | |||
The new government breaks Putin’s hold over the media by dissolving the media conglomerate run by Putin’s colleague. Although there is an initial scramble by investors to purchase the separate TV channels and newspapers at very low prices and some there are a number of hostile take-overs, by 2016 there is a relatively independent media similar to that of the mid 1990’s. | |||
===Period of 2015 - 2020=== | ===Period of 2015 - 2020=== | ||
Revision as of 19:31, 17 October 2009
The Scenario
Green Shoots
The Myth
People’s desire for a new beginning and a better quality of life for them and their children drives them to vote in a new government. Ushering in an era of change and liberalization, Russian style. Oil prices are volatile throughout this scenario
Timeline
Period of 2010 - 2015
The recession drags on in Russia. Unlike other emerging markets, the recession had a significant effect on the Russian economy. And like in most of the northern hemisphere the recession drags on in Russia despite early signs of a rapid recovery. The Russian economy lags far beyond the other BICs (Brazil, India, China) in terms of growth, largely due to relatively low and volatile oil prices $60-$80.
Despite unparalleled energy resources, power outages and heating shortages have been chronic problems in Russia for years due to crumbling infrastructure arising from a combination of chronic underinvestment in infrastructure, mismanagement by political appointees, and diversion of resources by corruption. These problems have the greatest impact in the winter when temperatures in much of Russia are well below 0 C. In February 2012, one month before the presidential election, heat and electricity shortages occur in a number of cities in western Russia. In particular, a number lower income apartment blocks occupied primarily by pensioners and young families are affected. Numerous schools and a hospital also experience outages. Although hundreds of people are moved to temporary accommodations in schools, churches and military facilities, thousands of people die of hypothermia and cold-related complications such as pneumonia. In one city a large number of people, primarily elderly people and children, are hospitalized with respiratory infections. Some of them subsequently die in the hospital, due at least in part to chronic shortage of resources and to overcrowding with flu patients. Although the story is initially not given significant coverage by the mainstream media, it is discussed by news websites and blogs, which give rise to exaggerated rumors and conspiracy theories. The mainstream media eventually begins to cover and downplay the story, even showing a characteristic on-site appearance of Putin on TV "solving the problem", however the late coverage is seen as a cover-up. Public sentiment places responsibility for the scandal squarely on the shoulders of Vladimir Putin and Dimitry Medvedev at the height of the election campaign.
In March 2012, Medvedev loses the presidential election by 1% to Gary Kasparov’s protégé, Sergey Korolev, from the Liberal Democratic party of Russia, who successfully capitalizes on the scandal to erode the credibility of Medvedev and Putin, accusing them of failing to address the needs of ordinary Russian people and instead lining their pockets and those of their oligarch cronies. After the election Putin is still prime minister, however the new president appoints a replacement. After a few politically dramatic months the Duma finally approves of the reformer's nominee for prime minister.
The new government immediately negotiates a commitment of support from the Russian armed forces. Though historically the armed forces have been politically neutral and subservient to the political leadership the new leaders seek the support as a hedge against the entrenched power of Putin and his FSB connections. The new leaders also leverage their new influence over the media to expose shortcomings and abuses during the Putin-Medvedev years and thus to solidify their base of public support. However they do not embark on a nationwide witch-hunt, which they fear might discredit and destabilize their own government. Aside from the selective removal of a few staunch Putin supporters from key government posts, much of the political apparatus initially remains unchanged.
Soon after the new reformers have settled into government, they deploy billions of rubles from the federal stabilization fund (i.e. reserves built up from oil and gas exports) to initiate major projects to improve infrastructure, education, technology, and healthcare. These infrastructure projects are intended to boost refining and smelting capacity, improve transportation and technology, and to raise health and education standards, but the effects of these investments will not be felt for years.
In 2013 Russia joins the WTO. Although the process of joining was started even before Putin’s time it was delayed a number of times, most notably in 2009 when the Medvedev-Putin administration decided to revise Russia’s WTO application to a joint application with Belorussia and Kazakhstan . The new government uses the WTO entry as an opportunity to break with the past and to publicly re-brand Russia as “open for business”. They also make attempts to increase dialogue and cooperation with NATO and China. However some assertive policies, such as Russia’s stance in the arctic and the Caucasus, and its support for regimes such as Iran and North Korea, are maintained.
The new government breaks Putin’s hold over the media by dissolving the media conglomerate run by Putin’s colleague. Although there is an initial scramble by investors to purchase the separate TV channels and newspapers at very low prices and some there are a number of hostile take-overs, by 2016 there is a relatively independent media similar to that of the mid 1990’s.