Difference between revisions of "Islamic Fundamentalism"
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Islamic fundamentalism can be defined as a part of Islamic practitioners, which aim at gathering more believers and expanding the religion by creating more and more Islamic states, without respecting the present constitution. Fundamentalism is different from extremism in the sense that fundamentalists are non-violent, and not explicitely hostile. Extremists, a small group within a country or a limited number of states, are explicitely hostile, and advocate and practise the use of violence to achieve their goals.[3] | Islamic fundamentalism can be defined as a part of Islamic practitioners, which aim at gathering more believers and expanding the religion by creating more and more Islamic states, without respecting the present constitution. Fundamentalism is different from extremism in the sense that fundamentalists are non-violent, and not explicitely hostile. Extremists, a small group within a country or a limited number of states, are explicitely hostile, and advocate and practise the use of violence to achieve their goals.[3] | ||
There are between 1.2 and 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. Half are women. While a substantial percentage of Islamic women support jihad, less than one in fifty Islamic terrorist acts is actually perpetrated by a female. That leaves us with a maximum pool of jihadists that is just over 50% of the total population. The overwhelming preponderance of terrorist acts are conducted by young Muslim men 15 to 30 years old. This age bracket covers about half of the male population of the Islamic world, leaving us with a potential jihad pool of 25% of all Muslims - approximately 300 million people. The most logical way to determine the percentage of Muslims who are salafi/fundamentalists - a precondition to jihad - is to consider the most recent elections in Islamic countries. For example, the fundamentalist Islamic group HAMAS received 65% of the popular vote in "Palestine." The somewhat secular Fatah, at least by comparison to HAMAS, won only 30% of the votes.[5] | There are between 1.2 and 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. Half are women. While a substantial percentage of Islamic women support jihad, less than one in fifty Islamic terrorist acts is actually perpetrated by a female. That leaves us with a maximum pool of jihadists that is just over 50% of the total population. The overwhelming preponderance of terrorist acts are conducted by young Muslim men 15 to 30 years old. This age bracket covers about half of the male population of the Islamic world, leaving us with a potential jihad pool of 25% of all Muslims - approximately 300 million people. The most logical way to determine the percentage of Muslims who are salafi/fundamentalists - a precondition to jihad - is to consider the most recent elections in Islamic countries. For example, the fundamentalist Islamic group HAMAS received 65% of the popular vote in "Palestine." The somewhat secular Fatah, at least by comparison to HAMAS, won only 30% of the votes. [5] | ||
== Enablers:== | == Enablers:== |
Revision as of 21:32, 17 September 2009
Associated with: Future of the European Union in 2030
Description:
The Arabic religious term for fundamentalist, is salaf. Salafi (Arabic for Ancestor) Islam (Arabic for Submission) is the religion of Muhammad (Islam's lone prophet and Allah's singular voice). It is the Islam recorded in the Qur'an (Recital from ar-Rahman and Allah), in the Hadith (Oral Reports from the Salaf/Ancestors regarding Muhammad), the Sira (Biography of Muhammad as told by the prophet's Companions), and Ta'rikh (History of Islam's Formation as recorded in the earliest Hadith). Salafi Islam is indistinguishable from Islamic Sunnah (Arabic for the Example of Muhammad - the basis the Islamic religion, law, custom, behavior, and culture). [5]
Islamic fundamentalism can be defined as a part of Islamic practitioners, which aim at gathering more believers and expanding the religion by creating more and more Islamic states, without respecting the present constitution. Fundamentalism is different from extremism in the sense that fundamentalists are non-violent, and not explicitely hostile. Extremists, a small group within a country or a limited number of states, are explicitely hostile, and advocate and practise the use of violence to achieve their goals.[3]
There are between 1.2 and 1.5 billion Muslims in the world. Half are women. While a substantial percentage of Islamic women support jihad, less than one in fifty Islamic terrorist acts is actually perpetrated by a female. That leaves us with a maximum pool of jihadists that is just over 50% of the total population. The overwhelming preponderance of terrorist acts are conducted by young Muslim men 15 to 30 years old. This age bracket covers about half of the male population of the Islamic world, leaving us with a potential jihad pool of 25% of all Muslims - approximately 300 million people. The most logical way to determine the percentage of Muslims who are salafi/fundamentalists - a precondition to jihad - is to consider the most recent elections in Islamic countries. For example, the fundamentalist Islamic group HAMAS received 65% of the popular vote in "Palestine." The somewhat secular Fatah, at least by comparison to HAMAS, won only 30% of the votes. [5]
Enablers:
- Polarization: Them versus us feeling still being enforced by the United States who are pointing out Islamic countries as being the 'axis of evil';
- Rapid industrialization and urbanization: Many traditional muslims feel displaced in the big city. Religion provides them some feeling of security;
- Indecent Western culture: Muslims are disgusted by some aspects of Western culture causing a chism between the two. Examples are narcotics, pornography and the disrespect against religion;
- Poverty: Religions number one feeding ground
- Why are terrorist mainly from middle class and have attended to school?
- Why are not poorer islamic countries producing more terrorists than the richier?
- Oil revenues: the bigger producers of oil and gas are islamic countries: this enable the current regimes to stay in power, fund propaganda inside and outside their countries and fund violent groups. Examples: wahabbi (saudi) clerics proselitize around the world with the support of the Saudi Arabia, in mosques financed with saudi money.
Inhibitors:
- Commerce globalization and communication technology tends to bring cultures together, decreasing extreme fundamentalism.
- Capitalism: Material wealth is a good replacement for religion.
Paradigms:
- Before the Islamic Revolution: Communism is bad
- After the Islamic Revolution: Islamic Fundamentalism is bad
- After 11/09/2001 the paradigma is shifting from Islamic fundamentalism is bad to Islam is bad.
Experts:
- Edmund "Terry" Burke III / University of California, Santa Cruz
Burke, professor of history, is an expert on Islam and the Middle East. He is the editor of "Struggle and Survival in the Modern Middle East" and coeditor of "Islam, Politics and Social Movements." Contact Burke at (o) 831-459-2287; eburke@ucsc.edu. [4] - Alan Godlas / University of Georgia
Godlas, professor of religion at UGA, has extensive expertise in Islam and Middle Eastern religions. He is also chair of the Arabic studies department and is knowledgeable on current world issues. Godlas' Web site (www.uga.edu/islam) provides a scholarly overview of Islam, Arabic and Western religions and related subjects including current events. Contact Godlas at (o) 706-542-1486; godlas@arches.uga.edu. [4] - Omid Safi / Colgate University
Safi, professor of philosophy and religion, can comment about Islam and humanitarian issues in the Middle East, the perception of this war in the Middle East and political issues related to religion. He is a member of the American Academy of Religion's Study of Islam steering committee and is the editor and contributor to the recently published "Progressive Muslims." Safi was born in the U.S. but grew up in Iran. His articles and reviews have appeared in International Journal of Middle East Studies, Journal of Islamic Studies, and The Muslim World Contact Safi at (o) 315-228-7690; osafi@mail.colgate.edu. [4] - Lina Haddad Kreidie / University of California, Irvine
Lina Haddad Kreidie is an authority on what she calls the "collision" between the West and Islam, in particular the underlying causes of anti-Americanism in the Middle East. She has interviewed Islamic fundamentalists, studying their behavior and perceptions. Unlike many scholars who focus on religious and cultural divides, Kreidie studies how Islamic fundamentalists perceive themselves and, as a result, how they react to world events. A lecturer in political science, she studies issues dealing with the Middle East and religious fundamentalism, as well as ethnic conflict and collective violence. Contact: Kreidie at 949-370-1104; lkreidie@uci.edu; or Lori Brandt,. media relations office, 949-824-5484. [4] - Michael Chamberlain / University of Wisconsin
Chamberlain is chair of the History Department's Middle East Studies Program and associate professor of history. He can discuss Islam, Islamic law and contemporary Islamic political movements. Contact Chamberlain at 608-265-2673; mchamber@facstaff.wisc.edu. - Paul Lubeck / University of California, Santa Cruz
Lubeck, professor of sociology, specializes in religious and social diversity within Islam. He is director of a Carnegie-funded research project examining how Islamic social movements are challenging economic globalization. Contact Lubeck at (o) 831-459-2906; lubeck@ucsc.edu. [4] - Mark LeVine / University of California, Irvine
LeVine, assistant professor of modern Middle Eastern culture, history and Islamic studies, can offer insight into contemporary Middle Eastern culture and society. He has lived and traveled throughout the Middle East and Europe and works in eight languages. His research interests include modern Islamic thought and practice, women in Islam, popular culture in the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy with the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian/Arab conflict, globalization studies, the history of terrorism, European colonialism and Islam and the West. Contact LeVine at 949-824-8304; mlevine@uci.edu; or Lori Brandt,. media relations office, 949-824-5484. [4] - Khalid Blankinship / Temple University
Blankinship, professor of religion, is a practicing Muslim who has lived and traveled extensively throughout the Middle East. He can offer commentary on the Islamic faith as well as many other aspects of Middle Eastern culture. Contact Blankinship at (o) 215-204-7712. - Mark Wegner / Tulane University
Wegner, professor of history, has worked as an Arabic translator at the U.N. and lived in the Middle East for several years. He can discuss the history of the Middle East, Islamic culture, reasons for terrorism and anti-U.S. sentiment in the Arab world. Contact Fran Simon or Madeline Vann, Tulane Media Relations, 504-588-5221. [4] - Mahmoud Ayoub / Temple University
Ayoub, religion professor, who is from Lebanon, teaches Islamic studies, and can talk about the political atmosphere in the Middle East and the anti-American feelings among Arab nations in the Persian Gulf. He just returned from a Fulbright-sponsored program at the International Islamic University in Malaysia. Contact Ayoub at 215-204-5603. [4] - Ebrahim Moosa / Duke University
Moosa is professor of religion and director of Duke's Center for the Study of Muslim Networks. His areas of expertise include Islamic law and thought, human rights and ethics. Contact Keith Lawrence at (o) 919-681-8059; keith.lawrence@duke.edu. [4] - Minoo Moallem / San Francisco State UniversityMoallem, assistant professor of women studies, is an expert on issues of women and Islamic fundamentalism and feminist movements in the Middle East among Muslims, and Iranian cultural politics. Contact Moallem at (o) 415-338-3065; minoom@sfsu.edu [4]
- Maziar Behrooz / San Francisco State UniversityBehrooz, assistant professor of history, is an authority on the history of the Islamic world and, current political and cultural trends. Behrooz created SFSU's two-part class on the history of the Islamic world from the years 500-1500 and 1500 to today. Contact Behrooz at (o) 415-338-7542 or (h) 510-549-0291; mroozbeh@sfsu.edu [4]
- Niloofar Haeri / Johns Hopkins University
Haeri, professor of anthropology, is the author of "Sacred Language, Ordinary People," which focuses on the centrality of classical Arabic - the official language of all Arab states. Although it is not spoken as a mother tongue by any group of Arabs, she says, classical Arabic is the language of the Quran, and is, therefore, considered sacred. Understanding this fact, she says, is the key to understanding the culture and politics of the Arab world. "Sacred Language, Ordinary People" discusses the role that language has played in shaping culture, politics and religion. Contact Amy Cowles, JHU media relations, 410-516-7160. - Reza Aslan / University of Iowa
Aslan, visiting assistant professor of religion, is an expert on Islam and the religion and politics of the Middle East. Contact Aslan at (o) 319-353-2845; reza-aslan@uiowa.edu [4] - Lenn Goodman / Vanderbilt University
Goodman, professor of philosophy and a scholar on Middle Eastern thought, says Muslims throughout the world have a choice to make about what Islam will mean for them and their communities. Both within and outside Islam there are those who believe Islam must mean militancy, conquest, and repression. However, "Students of Islam know the rich achievements of Islamic civilization in philosophy, literature, astronomy, medicine, history and the arts were nourished by openness to new ideas and readiness to respond creatively to what seemed new or even startling," says Goodman, author of "Islamic Humanism," recently published by Oxford University Press. Contact David Glasgow at Vanderbilt Public Affairs, 615-322-2706; david.glasgow@vanderbilt.edu [4]
Timing:
- Decentralized, fractional nature of the Islam: no central authority have the moral power to ban or condamn extreme behaviours from followers;
- Wahabite Sect fundend at the end of XVIII century;
- Fondation Muslim Brotherhood in early 1900s;
- Islamic Revolution in Iran;
- Collapse of Arab nationalism after the 1967 Arab-Israeli war;
- The fundamentalisic trend was started by the Islamic Revolution of 1979.
- Fall of the Soviet Union/Marxist dream of the late 1980s;
- Cold war Western support to Muslim groups as insurance against Communist encroachment.